The 2000 S.C. Lottery Vote: Shadows of the Past and Projection of the Future by Botsch, Robert E. & Botsch, Carol S.
Journal of Political Science 
Volume 32 Number 1 Article 3 
November 2004 
The 2000 S.C. Lottery Vote: Shadows of the Past and Projection 
of the Future 
Robert E. Botsch 
Carol S. Botsch 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops 
 Part of the Political Science Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Botsch, Robert E. and Botsch, Carol S. (2004) "The 2000 S.C. Lottery Vote: Shadows of the Past and 
Projection of the Future," Journal of Political Science: Vol. 32 : No. 1 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops/vol32/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Politics at CCU Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Political Science by an authorized editor of CCU Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact commons@coastal.edu. 
The 2000 S.C. Lottery Vote: 
Shadows of the Past and Projections 
of the Future 
Robert E. Botsch 
USC Aiken 
Carol S. Botsch 
USC Aiken 
The successful passage of the South Carolina "education 
lottery " referendum in 2000 is explained in terms of re-
gional differences that reflect differences in religion, ra-
cial and ethnic composition, partisan identifications , and 
political culture . A key variable in understanding the 
outcome is the changing political culture of the state . 
The dominant traditionalistic and morally conservative 
cultural mix has sometimes been challenged by individu-
alistic rejection of government regulation , including 
regulations on gambling , which has a long history in the 
state. Though the regional differences in culture from 
historical settlement patterns can still be seen , the bal-
ance of power has begun to shift as less morally conser-
vative outsiders move into the state and as citizens 
recognize the importance of public education . Many anti-
government traditionalists hoped the lottery would pro-
vide better education and lower taxes at the same time. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2000 the voters of South Carolina passed a statewide refer-endum to amend the state constitution so as to allow an "education lottery" for the state. The purpose of this paper is 
to explain the outcome in terms of key variables that both reflect 
the past of the Palmetto State and project changes into its future: 
region, religion, race, partisanship, and culture. 
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South Carolina is still a morally conservative and a politically 
traditionalistic state that is characterized by low levels of politi-
cal participation, social and political deference to the elite, and 
government actions that focus more on preserving the status quo 
than promoting the general welfare (Elazar, xxix-xxx). Another 
aspect of the state's southern culture is an exaggerated sense of 
individualism that rejects most government regulation and de-
mands that each person look out for him or herself (Botsch) . This 
tendency to reject government regulations sometimes comes into 
conflict with the long-standing role of government in preservi ng 
standards of conservative morality in the Bible Belt. A growing 
recognition by most residents that the state needs more resources 
for public education adds to the conflict over the proper role of 
government in contemporary South Carolina. This recogni tion 
could be seen in the heavy emphasis both gubernatoria l candi-
dates placed on improving education in the 2002 election. 
The population of South Carolina grew by 15 .1 % in the 
1990s, in part because of in-migration as people moved from 
colder northern climates to the South. In the year 2000 alone, the 
state was seventh in the country among the shipments of house-
hold goods handled by the country's largest mover.1 Based on an 
analysis of census data long forms, during the last half of the 
1990s, from 1995 through 2000, more than 132,000 more people 
moved to the state than left the state, and they came most fre-
quently from New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey, in that 
order. In comparing states, this represented the ninth largest net 
gain in the nation.2 The new South Carolinians arrived with their 
own political cultures, which, as we shall see, helped shift the 
balance of power in the outcome of the 2000 lottery referen dum. 
1 Tim Flach, "Migration boosts S.C. population," The State, 22 January 2002, B-1. 
2 Chris Roberts, "Migration to S.C. on the Rise," The State , 6 August 2003, A-3 . 
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A LOTTERY FOR SOUTH CAROLINA 
Although various forms of gambling were popular in early 
South Carolina, by the late 1800s lotteries had fallen out of fa-
vor. The delegates to the 1895 constitutional convention out-
lawed the practice. However, some eighty years later, bingo 
became legal as a means to raise money for charities. Video 
poker was legal through much of the 1980s and 1990s, becoming 
part of a political battle that foreshadowed the battle over a lot-
tery and playing a role in Governor David Beasley's 1998 defeat 
in his re-election bid by Democrat Jim Hodges. Hodges favored 
holding a referendum on video poker and made an education 
lottery a key plank in his platform.3 But in October of 1999 the 
State Supreme Court ruled that a proposed referendum on video 
poker was unconstitutional, while upholding a portion of the 
same law that banned video poker as of July of 2000.4 After his 
election, Hodges pushed for a referendum on the lottery. Much 
of the rhetoric during the lottery battle focused on morality and 
on the need to improve education. Speaking to a group of educa-
tors, Hodges argued "there is no greater crisis in our state than 
the education crisis." Kathy Bigham, chair of "No Lottery 2000," 
an anti-lottery group, responded by stating "I do believe that if 
we fund education with gambling that we will create a moral 
crisis for all South Carolinians. "5 Blacks, a key group of Democ-
3 Chuck Carroll and Douglas Pardue, "Kings & Jokers," The State, I August 1999, A-1, 
A-9-12; Melissa Manware, "Lancaster group mobilizes against gambling ," The State, 7 
September 1999, B-3 ; "Video Gambling Chronology ," The Augusta CJ,ronicJe, 24 JlDlC 2(XX), 
Available oo the internet: htip://www.au~cle .com'stori~__pokertime.shtrnl. 
• John Allard, "The Supreme Court decision," The State, 15 October 1999, A-13, A-15; 
Sammy Fretwell, "The Supreme Court decision," The State, 15 October 1999, A-13, A-
15.; Kenneth A Harris, "In the courtroom, the lobbyists couldn't help," The State, 15 
October 1999, Al 4; Clif LeBlanc and Chuck Carroll , "Lawsuit seeks to undermine poker 
vote," The State, 4 September 1999, B-1, B-4. 
5 Aaron Shein in, "Hodges says lottery can help solve education crisis," The State, 7 Sep-
tember 2000 , B-3. 
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ratic voters, were targeted during the campaign because they 
were likely to support the lottery as a means of improving educa-
tion, despite the opposition of their own religious leaders. Thus, 
many of the pro-lottery advertisements focused on how a lottery 
could help improve education.6 
Most major newspapers in the state also took editorial posi-
tions opposing the lottery, again using the rhetoric of morality. 
By and large, South Carolina's religious community opposed the 
lottery. In October of 2000, approximately four weeks prior to 
the referendum, more than 300 clergy and religious leaders from 
a variety of denominations stood outside of the State House to 
read a statement opposing the lottery. Among the opponents were 
representatives from the Black community, a key constituency 
for any southern state seeking passage of a lottery. 7 Although 
church leaders expressed support for education, they argued that 
the lottery was "immoral," would "dirninish ... good govern-
ment," and was contrary to the teachings of the Bible.8 
In the end, the lottery referendum passed with the support of 
54% of the voters.9 Blacks proved critical to its passage, with 
75% voting in favor of the lottery. A modest majority of whites, 
55%, voted against it.10 
REGION, RELIGION, RACE AND POLITICAL CULTURE 
While most states have a distinctive political culture, one can 
find cultural differences within any single state. South Carolina 
6 John Monk, "Hodges put machine to work for lottery," The State 9 November 1999, B-
1, B-2 . 
7 Allison Askins , "Christian churches unite to oppose lottery," The State 3 October 2000, 
B-1, B-5 . 
' Askins, supra. 
'Valerie Bauerlein and Aaron Sheinin, "Opponents stressing details," The State, 9 No-
vember 2000, B-1, B-3. 
10 Lee Bandy and Chris Roberts , "Black vote clinched lottery win," The State, 9 Novem-
ber 2000, B-1, B-7. 
TH E J OURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
SOUTH CAROLINA LOTTERY 79 
is no exception. Many observers divide the state into two or three 
different cultural sections (Wallace; Writers' Program; Moreland, 
Steed, and Baker). The upcountry or Piedmont plateau is the 
northwestern half of the state. The lowcountry or the coastal 
plain is the lower southeastern section . The dividing line is de-
fined by the first set of rapids on rivers-the "fall line." Some-
times the "midlands" are distinguished from the upcountry and 
lowcountry, though their topological distinctiveness is less pre-
cise. For the purposes of this paper and simplicity, we shall re-
strict our distinction to only the upcountry and the lowcountry. 
Geography and topography had a great impact on who settled 
in these regions and how they lived and prospered. With different 
people came different cultural baggage. Dissimilar lifestyles in-
creased those differences. Moreover, the institution of slavery 
and later the economic stagnation following the Civil War pre-
vented any great in-migration of outsiders to dilute those differ-
ences. 
Anglican aristocrats and large numbers of enslaved Africans 
settled the lowcountry, where the economy centered around the 
plantation. They generally built their plantations below the fall 
line because large farming operations were less practical above 
the fall line . Topography and soil conditions were less favorable, 
and in addition, the rapids made impractical the transportation of 
large amounts of agricultural products to the coast for export. 
Even today one can find statistically significant differences in the 
percentage of Episcopalians, who are the religious descendents 
of Anglicans, among the regions of the state. More members of 
this small, relatively liberal religious group are found in the low-
country. Moreover, despite generations of social upheaval and 
great migrations, the percentage of Blacks living in lowcountry 
and midlands counties is far higher than in the upcountry. 
Scotch-Irish and Germans migrated to the upcountry, and 
scratched out a living on small farms above the fall line. They 
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brought with them their religions, which contained many moral 
prohibitions, including a prohibition on gambling. They were 
more likely to be part of the great religious awakenings in early 
American history, taking their moral beliefs into the Baptist 
churches that were springing up like mushrooms across the 
South Carolina frontier. Moreover, they held the people and cul-
ture of the lowcountry in great disdain (Moreland, Steed, and 
Baker, 7). Even today one finds significantly more people who 
claim Irish heritage in the upcountry than in the lowcountry. The 
same is true of Scottish, though to a lesser extent. There is a 
large regional difference in those who claim adherence to the 
Southern Baptist church. In the average upcountry county, a full 
third of the population count themselves as Southern Baptists, as 
compared to a fifth of the population in lowcountry counties. 
Every culture has some internal contradictions. So it is with 
the socially and morally conservative traditionalistic culture of 
South Carolina. It may well be the most traditionalistic of all 
states (Elazar, xxx). It does not have an individualistic culture 
because South Carolinians do not see politics as a competitive 
business in which government provides services in return for 
votes (Elazar, xxvii). But the state's political culture contains one 
strong element of the individualistic culture. South Carolinians 
have long seen the private realm as of greater importance than 
the public realm, even when they are in great need of public 
help. Historically, South Carolinians have rejected collective ac-
tion in favor of individual attempts to survive, even when the 
collective efforts of common people were the only way to com-
bat the power of those who ran mill towns and controlled the 
land in rural areas (Botsch). Individualism expressed through 
extreme notions of self-reliance, volunteerism, and of individual 
and family honor that can be defended through violent outbursts 
have all been noted by many observers of southern life, culture 
and politics (Cash, 349-40; Reed, 33, 43; Havard, 702-3). 
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Even the dominant religious institution of the white South, 
the Southern Baptist Church, reflects the individualistic element 
of southern culture. Until the 1990s, when conservative elements 
took over the reins of the organization, a prime belief of the 
church was the "priesthood of the believer." No leader was to tell 
members how to interpret scriptures or create any official doc-
trine of the church. That was all left to individuals and to indi-
vidual churches. Although few took these freedoms outside the 
conservative moral consensus and although those who did were 
often socially ostracized, the right was cherished in principle, if 
not in practice. 
In the context of the issue of central concern in this paper, the 
2000 lottery vote, the individualistic ethic of South Carolinians 
presented an obstacle to religious leaders. While those most 
closely tied to formal religious organizations tended to call for 
government restrictions on the right of any person to throw his or 
her money to the winds of chance, those who were less closely 
tied to conservative religious groups were much more difficult to 
influence. Playing the lottery might be a sin, but that was be-
tween each person and his or her Maker, not something govern-
ment should prohibit. 
COUNTY AND REGIONAL LEVEL ANALYSIS 
If we examine the lottery vote on a county-by-county basis, 
we can see several patterns in terms of region, religion, race, and 
partisanship, all of which illuminate these cultural differences 
and contradictions. Let us briefly examine each one. 
The regional differences in the state had a dramatic impact on 
the lottery vote. In Figure 1, the darkened line running in a north-
easterly direction across the middle of South Carolina divides 
the state into upcountry counties and lowcountry counties. The 
darker colors on the map correspond to greater support for the 
lottery. As one moves from the upcountry to the lowcountry, 
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FIGURE 1 
UP AND LOWCOUNTRY AND PERCENTAGE FAVORING LOTTERY 
BY COUNTIES IN SOUTH CAROLINA, 2000 
r~:u N T<i 47,9 ('9) 49.2 To 51.8 {9) 
. 62.5 ro· 68.5 (9) 
57.1 TO 63.2 ('9) 
53.~ .. T.o eu (11t 
~ 
support for the lottery grew. The average vote for the lottery in 
counties above the fall line was 49.3%, while the average "yes" 
vote in lowcountry counties was 61.4%. 
One should note that even though upcountry counties rejected 
the lottery, the margin was extremely narrow. The overwhelming 
vote in the lowcountry was more than enough to turn the tide. 
This finding is consistent with regional patterns long observed in 
South Carolina political history. For example, the mini-bottle 
referendum of 1972 also fell along regional lines. Twelve of the 
fourteen counties that rejected the proposed constitutional 
change to allow the sale of liquor in mini-bottles were in the up-
country (Moreland, Steed, and Baker, 13). 
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As noted above, regional differences are shorthand for racial 
and religious differences, as well as the partisan differences that 
correspond with race and religion. We cannot easily separate 
these things out using aggregate data. However, the expected 
patterns are clearly present. In terms of race, one sees the same 
pattern as one sees with the lottery vote. The correlation between 
percentage Black population and support for the lottery was 
+.63. 
Religion was also clearly at work. Southern Baptists are the 
largest religious denomination in the state, and they are almost 
exclusively white. Where relatively many Southern Baptists 
lived, the lottery did badly. The correlation between percentage 
Southern Baptists and the pro lottery votes in counties is a -.54. 
However, because so few Blacks are affiliated with the 
Southern Baptist denomination, one might suspect that this rela-
tionship is purely spurious. While that may explain part of what 
we see on this map, having a lot of white adherents among the 
Southern Baptists plays at least some role. We regressed percent-
age Baptist on percentage voting for the lottery and then added 
percentage black as another independent variable. While the 
standardized correlation coefficient for percentage Baptist did 
drop, it and percentage black both remained statistically signifi-
cant predictors. While this evidence is less than totally conclu-
sive, it does strongly suggest that the percentage of Southern 
Baptists in a county had an effect independent of race in reduc-
ing the pro-lottery vote.11 
11 Race and Southern Baptists arc strongly negatively correlated (r = -.468, p < .01), so 
multicollinearity is a significant problem in interpreting any regression . We controlled for 
race in another less fonnal way by pairing counties with similar racial compositions but 
different Southern Baptist compositions . We were able to identify eight pairs of counties 
in which the racial compositions were within two percentage points of each other while 
the percentage of the populations that were Southern Baptist adherents were quite differ-
ent. When a third or fourth county had a similar percentage of Black residents, we chose 
the pair in which the differences in Southern Baptists were greatest. In the two pairs with 
Note continues 
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Turning to partisanship, we can approximate the Democratic 
vote in each county by the percentage that Democratic candidate 
Jim Hodges received in the 1998 election. As noted earlier, 
Hodges had made creating an "education lottery" a major part of 
his campaign. The correlation between the 1998 vote for Hodges 
and the 2000 lottery vote was +.67. However, we must be careful 
about drawing a firm conclusion, because Hodges did extremely 
well in counties with a large Black vote. So the relationship may 
be as much or even more the result of the voting behavior of 
Blacks, who are also the most loyal Democratic partisans in the 
state. When we regressed both percentage black and percentage 
for Hodges on the percentage for the lottery, percentage black 
dropped out as a significant predictor. Unlike the situation with 
Southern Baptists, we cannot separate out the influence of race 
from partisanship.12 
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL ANALYSIS 
One can only do so much analysis using aggregate data be-
cause aggregate data can only suggest how individuals behave. 
To analyze individual behavior we will turn to an exit poll per-
the highest percentage Black population, the relationship is not as expected. The county 
with the higher percentage Southern Baptist reported a higher percentage of votes for the 
lottery than the counties with which they are paired . All four counties in these first two 
pairs are lowcountry counties with very high percentages of Blacks in the population 
(ranging from 54 to 63%). However, the other six pairs all have the hypothesized rela-
tionship . The county with the higher percentage Southern Baptist population reported a 
lower percentage of votes for the lottery. What seems to be happening is that when the 
percentage of Blacks is over 50%, the percentage of white Baptists in the county did not 
increase lottery opposition. However, when the percentage of Blacks falls below 50%, 
then the percentage of Southern Baptists in the county had a negative impact on votes for 
the lottery. 
12 Race and partisanship, as measured by the Hodges vote in 1998, arc correlated with 
each other far more strongly (r = +.875, p < .01) than race and the Southern Baptists 
(r = - .468 , p < .01 ) . Therefore, multicollinearity between race and partisanship is so 
great that it is impossible to sort out the separate influences of these two variables on the 
lottery vote. 
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formed on Aiken County voters. 13 Aiken County lies on the di-
viding line between the upcountry and the lowcountry. It 
matched the statewide results in that 54% of the voters in the 
county approved the lottery, the same percentage as for the entire 
state. Aiken is a county that has been greatly affected by the in-
migration of non-southerners associated with the defense indus-
try at the Savannah River Site, where tritium was extracted as a 
component for nuclear weapons, and where today wastes are 
stored and processed. Like many places in the state, it has also 
developed a significant retirement population attracted by a 
warm climate, low taxes, and nearby amenities and services. 
Aiken has affluent golf communities, crumbling textile mill vil-
lages where generations of southerners have lived, and many 
small farms. While we cannot generalize to the state as a whole, 
we can certainly identify individual social and demographic fac-
tors that are associated with support of gambling that are at least 
suggestive of the factors at play in the rest of the state. 
The exit poll strongly suggests that a number of cultural, 
demographic, and political factors were at play in explaining the 
lottery vote. Race played a powerful role. The vote was almost 
evenly split among whites, who divided 49% to 51 % against the 
lottery in the sample, a margin that is too close to call for the 
general population. Among Blacks, however, the vote split 75% 
in favor to 25% against, a clear vote for the lottery. We could not 
13 Professor Robert Botsch 's Political Science Research Methods students perfonned the 
exit poll on 568 voters in ten precincts . These precincts represented the different geo-
graphical and demographic parts of the county that had in the past been representative of 
the county as a whole (such surveys have been perfonned since the early I 980s). The 
students performed a systematic sampling technique in two different time slots for each 
precincL They chose males and females in approximately equal numbers . The voting 
results for the sample were well within the margin of sampling error for the actual votes 
for the presidential election and the lottery referendum. One may reasonably conclude 
that the sample approximates a random sample and is representative of the county voters 
in that particular election. 
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identify any subgroups of Blacks who opposed the lottery. 
Among Blacks, regardless of education, income, religious fun-
damentalism, or frequency of church attendance, strong majori-
ties favored the lottery. The shifts were in the expected directions 
with support falling as education, income, and church attendance 
went up. Self-identified fundamentalists were less likely to sup-
port the lottery than non-fundamentalists, but a majority still 
supported the lottery over the objections of their religious lead-
ers. Majorities of Blacks in every subgroup favored the lottery. 
We thought that perhaps the explanation for Black support 
might be more a function of income than race. The group of 
whites most likely to support the lottery was low-income (less 
than $25,000 family income) non-fundamentalists. But when we 
compared these whites to similar blacks, black support was still 
six percentage points higher (77% v. 71 %, respectively). Just as 
we found in looking at aggregate county level data, individual 
data support the hypothesis that differences in racial subcultures 
played a major role in the outcome of the election. 
Because Black voting behavior on the lottery question was so 
different than that of whites, we separated out whites to see what 
factors influenced their votes. Several subgroups of whites did 
give the lottery majority support: non-southerners, non-
fundamentalists, those who do not attend church, those with fam-
ily incomes of less than $25,000 a year, those in two education 
groups (less than high school and with some college but less than 
four years), those who strongly agreed that more money needed 
to be spent on education in the state, and those who hoped that 
proceeds could be used to reduce taxes spent on education. Let 
us briefly discuss each of these factors, the impacts of which are 
summarized in Table 1. 
As noted earlier, the in-migration of people who do not con-
sider themselves Southerners and who bring with them the cul-
ture of other regions of the nation is slowly changing the culture 
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TABLE! 
FACTORS EXPLAINING 
WmTE VOTER SUPPORT FOR THE LOTTERY IN 2000 
Region 
Sub-Groups 
self-identified Southerners 
self-identified non-Southerners 
Religious Fundamentalism 
religious fundamentalists 
non-religious fundamentalists 
Church attendance 
Family Income 
Education 
none in last week 
once in past week 
several times in past week 
Jess than $25,000 
more than $25,000 
Jess than high school or 1-3 years college 
high school or college degree or more 
More Money for Education in SC 
"strongly agree" 
"agree" to "strongly disagree" 
Use Money to Reduce Taxes 
"strongly agree" to mixed 
"disagree" to "strongly disagree" 
Political Party 
Democrats 
Republicans 
Percent 
for 
Lottery 
48% 
64% 
39% 
57% 
69% 
48% 
21% 
62% 
48% 
57% 
46% 
60% 
39% 
55% 
49% 
70% 
44% 
Significance 
of 
Difference 
.06 
.00 
.00 
.06 
.02 
.00 
.02 
.00 
of South Carolina. According to U.S. Census figures, in 1990 
just over 69% of all residents were native to the state. Between 
1990 and 2000 the percentage of natives dropped ten percentage 
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points to 59% native. Many of these in-migrants come from 
states that already have lotteries. They are also less likely to 
bring with them socially conservative values associated with re-
ligious fundamentalism. In our sample of Aiken County voters, 
nearly half of all whites who considered themselves southern ers 
also identified themselves as religious fundamentalists. Less than 
one in six non-southern whites were fundamentalists. These in-
migrants seem to have voted differently on the lottery questi on 
than natives (the difference between self-identified southern 
whites and non-southern whites was right on the edge of statisti-
cal significance at p = .06). As in-migrants grow in number their 
impact on the cultural mix will be felt more and more. 
Religious fundamentalism and frequency of church atten-
dance had a strong impact on white voting. Combining these two 
factors had a powerful impact on the vote. A little over 80% of 
whites who were fundamentalists and who attended church sev-
eral times each week voted against the lottery. But only a little 
more than 10% of the sample fit into this category (62 of 568). 
Religiously active fundamentalist whites are but a small porti on 
of the electorate and will only make a difference when the larger 
and more secular part of the electorate is evenly split on some 
question or when voting turnout is low. 
Whites in the lowest income groups (less than $25,000 family 
income) seemed to be on the opposite side of the lottery questi on 
than those in higher income groups. The difference was right on 
the border of what is considered a statistically significant rela-
tionship. However, if we look at the full range of income groups, 
we see what appears to be a far more complex relationship, al-
though the subgroups are far too small to produce anything close 
to statistical significance. Support falls below 50% when income 
of white families is between $25,000 and $40,000, but then it 
rises slightly above 50% again in the higher income groups up to 
$100,000, but again falls below 50% in the over $100,000 group . 
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This suggests that opposition was greatest within the white lower 
middle class. This is not a function of religious fundamentalism 
because a higher percentage of whites in the lowest income 
groups are fundamentalists than whites in lower middle or high 
income groups. 
Education also has a complex relationship with the lottery 
vote among whites. The relationship is similar to what we saw in 
examining income. The greatest support comes from those with a 
less than high school education (72%), followed by those with 
one to three years of college (55%). The greatest opposition 
comes from those with education beyond a college degree ( only 
42% favored). Those with a high school degree and those with a 
college degree also opposed the lottery ( 46% and 48% favored 
respectively), but were more evenly split than those with the 
highest level of education. 
One possible explanation could be differences in the under-
standing of the issue. Presumably education should work to in-
crease citizen understanding of issues. The more one knows 
about the lottery the more one might question the value of the 
lottery to improve education and the more one should understand 
disparate impact on economic classes. We asked several factual 
questions about the lottery to see how well-informed voters were 
on the issue. Education had no relation to knowledge about the 
percentage impact the lottery would have on total education 
spending in the state (a less than 5% increase). All education 
groups grossly overestimated the impact. Nor did education have 
any relation to knowledge of how much of the lottery proceeds 
would go to education (about a third). Most again grossly over-
estimated the money for education. However, the highest educa-
tion group (those with post college education) was significantly 
more likely to know that the lottery would take more money 
from the poor than from those who are better off. Two-thirds of 
this highest edu1,;ated group gave the correct answer. Only about 
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a fourth of those with less than a high school education knew 
that it would cost the poor more. About half of those in the mid-
dle education groups gave the correct answer. So an altruistic 
concern for the poor among those who were most well edu-
cated-not knowledge about the impact of the lottery on educa-
tion-may best explain their lack of support for the lottery. We 
have no explanation as to why those with some college may have 
been more supportive than those with just high school degrees, 
except that they were more likely to be non-Southerners. 1• 
The political culture of South Carolina has long been one that 
opposed increased taxes or expanded government services. On 
the other hand, a long, slow process of public education may be 
awakening voters to the fact that the state can never make im-
provements without more resources devoted to education. Nearly 
90% of the voters in our exit poll were on the "agree" side of the 
statement that "more money is needed for education in South 
Carolina" (54% "strongly" agreed). Nearly three-fourths agreed 
with the statement "public school teachers in South Carolina 
who meet national standards should have their salaries raised to 
the national average, even if that means raising taxes" (here the 
"strongly agrees" and "agrees" were about evenly split). 
An "education lottery" fits well with both the older anti-tax 
culture and the newer reali:zation that improvements in public 
14 In a countywide telephone survey performed in 1999, we found similar and even more 
striking results . In this survey we asked a series of eight political knowledge questions 
(such as the terms of U.S. House and Senate members and names of South Carolina's two 
U.S. Senators) and also asked about whether they supported the lottery. We found that 
those who were more politically knowledgeable were significantly more likely to oppose 
the lottery (p = .03 with whites only; the black subsample was too small to analyze by 
itself). This telephone survey of 200 Aiken County adult residents was performed by 
Professor Robert Botsch's Political Science Research Methods students . The sample was 
selected using telephone numbers generated randomly. All numbers were called at least 
four times before replacement, and the individual respondent in each household inter-
viewed was chosen using the "most recent birthday" method so that they were randomly 
chosen . The sampling error for this survey is plus or minus 7%. 
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education require more resources. Nevertheless, only those with 
the strongest level of support for more education spending were 
moved to support the lottery. Only among those who "strongly" 
agreed that more money is needed did the lottery garner majority 
support. The question about raising teacher pay even if it meant 
raising taxes had no bearing on the lottery vote. On the other 
hand, one could see the old anti-tax culture at work in the vote. 
We asked voters if they felt that lottery proceeds should be used 
to lower existing taxes that support education. About two-thirds 
of all the white voters agreed or had mixed feelings. As seen in 
the table above, a majority of these voters favored the lottery. 
Having at least mixed feelings about using proceeds to reduce 
existing taxes played a role in explaining why many white voters 
supported the lottery. Many apparently felt that a lottery would 
allow them to in effect have their cake and eat it too-the state 
could have more money for education and also lower taxes . 
Partisanship played an important role in the outcome of the 
lottery. The GOP tried to stay out of the lottery fight, even 
though it officially opposed gambling in any form in its state 
party platform. The issue was too divisive for the party because 
many lowcountry Republicans were on the pro-lottery side. As 
lottery supporter Republican state Senator Arthur Ravenel Jr. of 
Charleston said, "We gamble, cuss, drink liquor and raise hell 
down here. But we're very conservative with our sins." 15 The 
white Democrats, on the other hand, voted to endorse the lottery 
as the centerpiece of Governor Jim Hodges' education program 
and spent money in its support. 16 The results, at least as seen in 
Aiken County, indicate that white Democrats were more united 
and far more likely to vote in favor, with 70% of all white De-
15 Lee Bandy, "Split on the lottery , GOP will stay out of the fight," The State, JO Sep-
tember 2000, D-1 . 
16 Bandy, supra . 
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mocratic identifiers supporting the lottery. Only 40% of the Re-
publicans supported the lottery. The lottery was an issue that at 
least temporarily revived the state's Democratic Party. The lot-
tery was a wedge issue that split the Republican Party, separating 
its social and moral conservatives who live primarily in the up-
country from its relatively more permissive and individualistic 
elements in the lowcountry. 
CONCLUSION 
The lingering shadows of centuries old ethnic settlement pat-
terns on current regional, racial, and religious dynamics in South 
Carolina contribute significantly to understanding the 2000 edu-
cation lottery vote. Those historic patterns clearly help explain 
the differential support for the lottery, which was stronger in 
Iowcountry counties and weaker in upcountry counties. Those 
patterns also help us explain related differences in support for the 
lottery among voters of different religious backgrounds, races, 
and partisan leanings. 
Yet on-going changes in the state are also relevant to explain-
ing the vote. As non-southerners move to the state, both the bal-
ance within each region and the political culture of the state as a 
whole appear to be shifting. The upcountry is still most conser-
vative on issues such as gambling, but conservatives have at best 
a narrow majority. The state is still culturally conservative, but at 
the same time it contains a strong individualistic element that 
often rejects government prohibitions on gambling, just as it has 
in the past rejected mandatory requirements for wearing motor-
cycle helmets. At the same time, as the lottery vote indicates, the 
changing citizenry seems less willing than in the past to use gov-
ernment to enforce conservative standards of social morality. In 
addition, the vote indicates that while Blacks may share the reli-
gious fundamentalism label with many white citizens and may 
hear their religious leaders denounce the lottery as immoral, 
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theirs is a different flavor of fundamentalism, as least respecting 
an acceptance of games of chance. Most citizens of both races 
recognize the need for more resources for public education, and 
they have embraced the lottery as a kind of "voluntary tax" that 
will provide some of those resources. A notable proportion 
would even raise mandatory taxes. However, many still embrace 
the hope that lottery proceeds will lower mandatory taxes that 
the traditionalistic culture so detests. 
The culture of South Carolina is slowly changing. The moral 
conservatism of the upcountry is now battling to maintain its 
dominance in that region, at least with respect to gambling. The 
battle has long been over in the lowcountry, which never fully 
embraced religious restrictions on individual morality. Regional 
differences still exist, but those differences are fading into ever 
more faint shadows as waves of in-migrants cast a new light on 
the political culture of the state. 
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